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DO YOU SEE WHAT I SEE?
PROBLEMS WITH JUROR BIAS IN VIEWING BODY-
CAMERA VIDEO EVIDENCE
Morgan A. Birck*
In the wake of the Michael Brown shooting in Ferguson, Missouri, advocates 
and activists called for greater oversight and accountability for police. One of the 
measures called for and adopted in many jurisdictions was the implementation of 
body cameras in police departments. Many treated this implementation as a sign of 
change that police officers would be held accountable for violence they perpetrate. 
This Note argues that although body-camera footage may be useful as one form of 
evidence in cases of police violence, lawyers and judges should be extremely careful 
about how it is presented to the jury. Namely, the jury should be made aware of 
their own implicit biases and of the limited nature of the footage. Taking a look at 
the biases that all jurors hold as well as the inherent subjectivity of video footage, 
this Note shows how implicit biases and the myth of video objectivity can create 
problems in viewing body-camera footage, and the footage should therefore be treated 
carefully when introduced at trial.
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INTRODUCTION
Nine hundred eighty-seven people were shot and killed by police 
in 2017.1 One hundred and four of those deaths were recorded by body 
cameras.2 What will happen with that body-camera footage? Will the 
footage prove conclusively what happened and bring justice? How will a 
jury view the footage and decide?
A revolution occurred in policing after the shooting of Michael 
Brown in Ferguson, Missouri.3 On August 9, 2014, Brown, an eighteen-
year-old Black college student, was shot six times by Ferguson police of-
ficer Darren Wilson.4 He was left on the street for hours.5 For over a 
week, people protested in the streets.6 Missouri Governor Jay Nixon de-
clared a state of emergency, imposing a curfew in Ferguson.7 Protests 
sparked again a few months later when a state grand jury decided not to 
indict Officer Wilson.8 Most significantly, Brown’s death ignited a deeper
conversation in the United States about police violence and particularly 
the racial disparities in use-of-force.9
After Ferguson, President Barack Obama and his administration 
proposed several law enforcement initiatives aimed at reducing police vi-
1. Fatal Force, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/
police-shootings-2017/ .
2. Id.
3. Max Ehrenfreund, Body Cameras For Cops Could Be the Biggest Change to Come Out 
of the Ferguson Protests, WASH. POST (Dec. 2, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/wonk/wp/2014/12/02/body-cameras-for-cops-could-be-the-biggest-change-to-
come-out-of-the-ferguson-protests/?utm_term=.4261c86a113f.
4. Major Characters and Timeline in the Michael Brown Case, ST. LOUIS POST –
DISPATCH, Nov. 25, 2014, at A5.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Monica Davey & Julie Bosman, Protests Flare After Ferguson Police Officer Is Not In-
dicted, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/25/us/
ferguson-darren-wilson-shooting-michael-brown-grand-jury.html.
9. See, e.g., Howard M. Wasserman, Moral Panics and Body Cameras, 92 WASH. U. L.
REV. 831, 835 (2015) (“Ferguson became a flashpoint for broader concerns about police 
misconduct, unreasonable force, racial justice, the role of public spaces for First Amend-
ment activity, and how police respond to public First Amendment Activity.”) [hereinafter 
Wasserman, Moral Panics]; Chapter Four Considering Police Body Cameras, 128 HARV. L.
REV. 1794, 1794-95 (2015).
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olence, including equipping police departments with body cameras.10
Commentators began to consider body cameras as a cure-all to the prob-
lem of police violence, and body-camera use was supported widely, in-
cluding by “the public, the White House, federal legislators, police offi-
cials, police unions, and the American Civil Liberties Union.”11 These 
supporters believed that video footage could be objective carriers of the 
truth, “eliminat[ing] the he-said/he-said ambiguity that often characteriz-
es police-citizen encounters, and deter[ring] misbehavior by police and 
citizens.”12 Further, law enforcement may prefer body cameras to civil-
ian-held cameras, as the perspective of body cameras is as if the viewer is 
a police officer herself, “giving viewers a sense of what the officer sees 
and hears” and also giving the “legally relevant perspective.”13
By the end of 2015, only 18 percent of police agencies had fully
implemented body cameras.14 However, about half of agencies had at 
least started adopting cameras, and 95 percent intended to implement a 
full program.15 The search for “magic policy solutions” and “public pres-
sure to prosecute wrongdoers” seemed to be reflected in this overhaul of 
police policy.16
But body cameras are not a panacea. On the front end—the inter-
actions between the police and citizens—body cameras have not been as 
effective as proponents had hoped.17 Research indicates that there is no 
statistically significant effect of body cameras worn by police, and that 
wearing them does not alter police behavior.18 The criminal justice po-
tential of cameras has so far not been any more promising. In 2017, of 
1,147 cases where there was a police killing, 149 of those cases involved 
10. Ehrenfreund, supra note 3.
11. Wasserman, Moral Panics, supra note 9, at 833. See also German Lopez, The Failure 
of Police Body Cameras, VOX (July 21, 2017, 10:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-
and-politics/2017/7/21/15983842/police-body-cameras-failures (citing polls that found 
nearly 90 percent support for body-worn cameras among Americans generally).
12. Wasserman, Moral Panics, supra note 9, at 833.
13. Alberto R. Gonzales & Donald Q. Cochran, Police-Worn Body Cameras: An Anti-
dote to the “Ferguson Effect”?, 82 MO. L. REV. 299, 308 (2017).
14. Mike Maciag, Survey: Almost All Police Departments Plan to Use Body Cameras,
GOVERNING MAGAZINE (Jan. 26, 2016), http://www.governing.com/topics/public-
justice-safety/gov-police-body-camera-survey.html.
15. Id.
16. See Wasserman, Moral Panics, supra note 9, at 835.
17. See Michael Durkheimer, Why Don’t Police Cameras Work Like We Expected?,
FORBES (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaeldurkheimer/2017/10/
23/why-dont-police-body-cameras-work-like-we-expected/#520bc83b1244 (explaining 
that instances of and complaints of use-of-force by police did not decline in Washington, 
D.C. after body cameras were implemented).
18. Id.
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an unarmed suspect.19 Six-hundred-forty killings began with police re-
sponding to suspected non-violent offenses or cases where no crime was 
reported.20 Although nearly half of those killed reportedly had a gun on 
them, one in five “were not threatening anyone when they were 
killed.”21 Of the 1,147 cases in 2017, only thirteen cases resulted in 
charges being brought against an officer.22 Although many cases from 
2017 have not yet gone to trial, data from 2015 shows that only 1 per-
cent of cases in that year resulted in any officers involved being convicted 
of a crime.23 It seems, therefore, that even with video evidence, it is still 
exceedingly difficult to get a conviction in a use-of-force case.
Why has seemingly objective evidence of use-of-force so far failed 
to lead to convictions or changes in police behavior? One potential an-
swer is the pervasiveness of implicit biases in the United States. Implicit 
bias is driven by “attitudes and stereotypes that we have about social cat-
egories, such as genders and races.”24 An attitude is an association be-
tween a concept (here, Black Americans) and an “evaluative valence,” or 
a positive or negative psychological evaluation.25 A stereotype is another 
kind of association, in this case between a concept (Black Americans) and 
a trait, such as criminality.26 It is important to distinguish the two con-
cepts, because it is possible to have a positive attitude and a negative ste-
reotype of the same concept.27 For example, “one might have a positive 
19. MAPPING POLICE VIOLENCE, https://mappingpoliceviolence.org/ (last visited Oct. 
17, 2018). According to this site, there were 1,152 people killed by a police officer from 
January 1 through December 15, 2015 (this includes non-shooting deaths). Id. The 
Washington Post records 990 people shot and killed by police in 2015. Kimberly Kindy 
& Kennedy Elliott, 2015 Police Shootings Investigation, WASH. POST (Dec. 26, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/police-shootings-year-end/ . The 
number of indictments of police officers tripled in 2015 (18 for the year) compared with
averages over the previous ten years (5 per year). Id. “In [ten] of the 2015 cases, prosecu-
tors had a video record of the shooting, a big increase over previous years.” Id. “The Post 
found that 6 percent of the killings captured by body cameras.” Id. There were no con-
victions for the killings in the year 2015. Matt Ferner & Nick Wing, Here’s How Many 
Cops Got Convicted of Murder Last Year for On-Duty Shootings, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 13, 
2016), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/police-shooting-convictions_us_
5695968ce4b086bc1cd5d0da. “[S]ince 2005, there have only been [thirteen] officers con-
victed of murder or manslaughter in on-duty fatal shootings . . . .” Id.
20. POLICE VIOLENCE REPORT, policeviolencereport.org (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. MAPPING POLICE VIOLENCE, supra note 19.
24. Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1128 
(2012).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1129.
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overall attitude toward African Americans and yet still associate them 
with weapons.”28
Recent studies have shown that these attitudes can not only be ex-
plicit, but they can be implicit, or “not consciously accessible through in-
trospection.”29 These social cognitions impact a person’s behaviors and 
decision-making without the person’s knowledge of even having them.30
Implicit biases thus affect all of us in some way, and when it comes 
to the evaluation of interactions between police and citizens, may have 
dangerous effects. For instance, in the context of the jury, when viewing 
body-camera footage, implicit biases may dictate what the juror per-
ceives, or at the very least create a lens through which a juror will watch 
the footage. For, “as any undergraduate film student knows, what video 
actually says depends on a number of different considerations—who and 
what is depicted, who created the images and how, and details of the im-
ages themselves.”31 Additionally, what any viewer sees is “influenced by 
the viewer’s cultural, demographic, social, political, and ideological char-
acteristics.”32 This Note argues that while body cameras can help provide 
evidence in credibility battles between opposing witnesses, they are dan-
gerous because they give a narrow perspective of an encounter that may 
simply reinforce the implicit biases of those who watch the video. In ar-
guing this, this Note discusses how implicit biases, influenced by each ju-
ror’s subjective interpretation of the world, impact jurors in the court-
room, particularly in relation to video footage and specifically body-worn 
camera footage.
Part I discusses implicit bias and how it impacts every person in the 
criminal justice process, as well as how these biases necessarily inform 
how a jury looks at camera footage—especially body-camera footage. 
Part II discusses the issue of apparent objectivity of video footage and its 
actual subjectivity, looking at the Supreme Court’s decision in Scott v. 
Harris and its problems. Part III connects the implicit bias discussion and 
video discussion, to focus on how implicit bias informs body-camera 
analysis. Finally, Part IV examines possible solutions to the problems with 
using body-camera footage as evidence in trial.
Ultimately, this Note cautions the use of body-camera footage as a 
cure-all for police brutality because the footage provides a narrow view 
of what occurred, and jurors who are shown the footage witness a story 
of White fear, which serves to reaffirm their own implicit biases. Body-
camera footage, while it can be helpful, must be used with skepticism and 
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Kang, supra note 24, at 1129.
31. Wasserman, Moral Panics, supra note 9, at 840.
32. Id.
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bolstered by additional evidence and implicit bias education to truly 
achieve justice.
Part I
Not many people would openly admit they are racist. Explicit rac-
ism is increasingly unacceptable normatively; however, unconscious atti-
tudes and biases exist underneath the surface of almost every individual.33
In part because of these biases, racial disparities continue to exist in the 
American justice system, especially in jury verdicts and sentencing.34 This 
Part discusses implicit bias and how every person harbors their own im-
plicit biases. It elaborates on how certain parts of the media exacerbate 
this bias. Finally, this part concludes that these biases necessarily inform 
how a jury looks at any camera footage, but especially body-camera foot-
age.
A.  Implicit Biases
American law has been shaped by the understanding that humans 
have attitudes and stereotypes, and these explicit social cognitions are 
easily recognizable and well-documented.35 For example, a private indi-
vidual may display explicit negative attitudes by refusing to serve an indi-
vidual of a different race.36 In fact, explicit racial social cognitions form 
much of the basis of our current antidiscrimination laws.37
However, recent psychological studies show that attitudes and ste-
reotypes can be implicit, and therefore can impact a person’s decision-
making and behaviors without the person knowing they are being influ-
enced by these attitudes and stereotypes.38 This means that although peo-
ple may outwardly condemn racism and embrace egalitarian values, im-
plicit attitudes and stereotypes can operate to distort decision-making, 
33. See, e.g., Jennifer K. Elek & Paula Hannaford-Agor, First, Do No Harm: On Ad-
dressing the Problem of Implicit Bias in Juror Decision Making, 49 CT. REV. 190, 190 (2013).
34. Id. at 191.
35. Kang, supra note 24, at 1129.
36. See Icek Ajzen & Martin Fishbein, Attitude-Behavior Relations: A Theoretical Analysis 
and Review of Empirical Research, 84 PSYCHOL. BULLETIN 888, 893 (1977) (discussing how 
almost all studies of attitudes toward Black people by White people show “nonsignificant 
relations between attitude and behavior”).
37. Kang, supra note 24, at 1129.
38. Id.
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particularly—at least in the United States—to the detriment of Black in-
dividuals.39
Social psychologists have documented the stereotype of Black 
Americans as violent and criminal for over fifty years,40 but the stereotype 
can be traced back to the foundation of slavery in the United States.41
This association occurs whether one intends it or not.42 Furthermore, 
there is a “bidirectionality” of associations—not only are Black Ameri-
cans associated with crime, but crime itself is associated with Black Amer-
icans.43 These bidirectional associations “function as visual tuning devic-
es—directing people’s eyes, their focus, and their interpretations of the 
stimuli with which they are confronted.”44 For example, individuals are 
more likely to feel that “mildly aggressive behavior” is more threatening 
if the actor is a Black person than if the actor is a White person.45
One study of implicit bias showed that participants in a study more 
quickly associated guns with Black faces, a bias called “weapon bias.”46 In 
this study, participants were asked to identify guns or harmless objects, 
with a human face flashing just before each object appeared (some ver-
sions included a Black face, some included a White face).47 In one version 
of the test, participants responded at their own pace.48 While accuracy 
was high regardless of race, “participants detected guns faster in the pres-
ence of a [B]lack face.”49 In a second version, participants had to respond 
within a half-second.50 In this version, participants “falsely claimed to see 
a gun more often when the face was Black than when it was White.”51
39. See, e.g., Elek & Hannaford-Agor, supra note 33, at 190-92; Samuel R. Sommers 
& Phoebe C. Ellsworth, White Juror Bias: An Investigation of Prejudice Against Black Defend-
ants in the American Courtroom, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL. & L. 201, 202 (2001).
40. Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 876 (2004).
41. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 28 (2010); Roger D. 
Abrahams, The Negro Stereotype: Negro Folklore and the Riots, 83 J. AM. FOLKLORE 229, 
230 (1970); Ronald E. Hall, The Ball Curve: Calculated Racism and the Stereotype of African 
American Men, 32 J. BLACK STUD. 104, 106 (2001); 13TH (Netflix 2016).
42. Eberhardt et al., supra note 40, at 876.
43. Id. at 877.
44. Id.
45. Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias in a Not Yet Post-
Racial Society, 91 N. CAR. L. REV. 1555, 1581 (2013).
46. B. Keith Payne, Weapon Bias: Split-Second Decisions and Unintended Stereotyping, 15 
CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 287, 287 (2006).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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Not only did study participants more quickly associate Black faces 
with guns, but participants (using a video game to simulate real-life situa-
tions) also fired at an armed target more quickly if he was Black and de-
cided not to shoot at an unarmed target more quickly if the unarmed tar-
get was White.52
A separate study concluded that Denver police officers have a great-
er ability to differentiate armed from unarmed targets than the communi-
ty they police, but that there were no differences between Denver offic-
ers and the Denver community in terms of the magnitude of bias.53
Officers were better than civilians in terms of final decisions: while civil-
ians tended to set lower criteria for shooting Black targets than White 
targets (i.e., they were “trigger happy”), this bias was much weaker, and 
possibly nonexistent, for officers.54 But, like the previous study, partici-
pants shot armed targets more quickly when they were Black rather than 
White and chose to not shoot unarmed targets more quickly when they 
were White.55 Additionally, officers serving in districts with a large popu-
lation, high rate of violent crime, and greater concentration of Black 
people showed increased bias in reaction times.56
52. This is what Joshua Correll calls “shooter bias.” Joshua Correll et al., The Police Of-
ficer’s Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1314, 1317 (2002). This is the first of two related stud-
ies. See infra note 53. The authors of the study gave participants an 850-millisecond win-
dow to “maximize correct responses.” Id. at 1318. The average proportion of errors 
across participants was 4 percent of the trials. Id. Within these errors (shooting unarmed 
targets more frequently than armed targets), though, the tendency to shoot the unarmed 
target was stronger when the target was Black than when the target was White. Id.
53. Joshua Correll et al., Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial Bias in the 
Decision to Shoot, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1006, 1012-13 (2007) [hereinafter 
Correll, Thin Blue Line]. The magnitude bias is the magnitude of the racial bias the partic-
ipants in the study exhibited based on their response times. To determine the magnitude, 
the researchers measured the response time of participants when faced with “stereotype-
incongruent” targets, i.e. unarmed Black targets and armed White targets, and compared
that with their response time when faced with “stereotype-congruent” targets. The bias 
shown by police officers and community members who were part of the study did not 
differ. This indicates that officers do not show greater bias than the people in the com-
munities they serve (although this does not mean that bias is not a problem in the com-
munity). Id. at 1015.
54. Id. at 1015.
55. Id. at 1013-14.
56. Id. at 1014.
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B.  The Media Stoking Racial Bias
The media, particularly the news media, further contributes to the 
stereotype that Black people are criminal and violent.57 Images in the 
news reinforce feelings of racial tension which then impact how individ-
uals interact with the criminal justice system, including strengthening bi-
ases against a Black defendant even if there is no publicity for his specific 
trial.58 This subpart will show how the media can reinforce racial biases, 
which in turn may affect juror decision-making.
To start, the news media overrepresents Black individuals as culprits
of violent crime, not aligning with actual arrest rates, while White indi-
viduals are overrepresented as victims of violence and as law-enforcers.59
Black individuals are more likely to have negative pretrial publicity, espe-
cially if the victim of the alleged crime is White.60
Additionally, Black individuals are more likely to live in poverty. 
This reality “encode[s] poverty as an especially [B]lack trait” and “un-
dermine[s] potential sympathy . . . for antipoverty programs.”61 This un-
dermining of antipoverty programs is important because poverty also is 
more often associated “with threats in the form of crime, violence, drugs, 
gangs, and aimless activity.”62 Instead of garnering support for antipoverty 
programs, messages of poverty reinforce racial resentment and correlate 
to White “support of punitive crime policies.”63 They also contribute to 
stereotypical associations between “[B]lacks, criminality, and guilt that 
can influence evaluations and behavior.”64 These stereotypical associations 
have real-world effects, such as the “shooter bias” described above.65
These associations don’t just occur in the news, but also in other 
television programming, movies, advertising, and sports.66 These associa-
57. Robert M. Entman & Kimberly A. Gross, Race to Judgment: Stereotyping Media and 
Criminal Defendants, 71 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 93, 97 (2008).
58. Id. at 97-98 (“These images . . . are a central component in a circular process by 
which racial and ethnic misunderstanding and antagonism are reproduced, and thus be-
come predictable influences in the criminal-justice process.”).
59. Id. at 98-99. See also ALEXANDER, supra note 41, at 106 (“[F]or nearly three dec-
ades, news stories regarding virtually all street crime have disproportionately featured Afri-
can American offenders.”).
60. Entman & Gross, supra note 57, at 100.
61. Id. at 102.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 103.
64. Id. at 102.
65. Id. at 104.
66. Entman & Gross, supra note 57, at 102. For example, the historic Zulu chief Zulu 
was depicted as a “bloodthirsty madman” in a 1986-T.V. miniseries called Shaka Zulu.
Helán E. Page, “Black Male” Imagery and Media Containment of African American Men, 99 
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tions reinforce negative racial stereotypes, which in turn affect behaviors 
of individuals.67 The media, therefore, has fed into the racialized fear of 
Black Americans, increasing and reinforcing negative stereotypes.68
C.  Jurors and Implicit Biases
The media has become a ubiquitous part of our lives and has the 
power to reach millions of people across the United States. Because of 
this, individuals across the United States are influenced by the images on 
their screens, from the news to television to film, that reinforce negative 
stereotypes of Black people. The reinforced stereotypes may influence 
behavior, and empirical studies show that they do.69 This subpart will dis-
cuss how the implicit biases explored above impact how jurors approach 
evidence. Because body-camera footage is evidence, jurors will approach 
it and judge it using their implicit biases; therefore, courts should caution 
jurors in placing too much weight on the footage without examining 
their own and the police officer’s biases.
Jurors are chosen from the “State and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed.”70 This means that jurors are average citizens 
who are selected at random, and who likely have implicit biases that have 
been reinforced by media stereotypes. When confronted with evidence 
in court, jurors are analyzing it through a lens shaped by their biases, 
whether or not they are conscious of them.
Studies that show the ways individuals react to Black suspects com-
pared with White suspects support the conclusion that when jurors see 
footage from the viewpoint of an officer, they are already harboring atti-
tudes in which they are more likely to see a Black person as dangerous, 
and thus are less likely to find problems with the officer’s conduct. For 
example, individuals may have a lower threshold for thinking it is ac-
ceptable to shoot Black targets.71 Because of this, those individuals may be 
more likely to see actions or objects in the body camera video that they 
feel justify the police using excessive force.
AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 99, 101 (1997). There was no mention of his “brilliant anticolo-
nial military innovations.” Id.
67. See Page, supra note 66, at 103.
68. See id.
69. See, e.g., Entman & Gross, supra note 57, at 104. For example, after a standard 
crime news “script,” “60 percent of viewers who saw a story with no image falsely re-
called seeing one, and 70 percent of those viewers believed the perpetrator to be African
American.” ALEXANDER, supra note 41, at 106.
70. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
71. See Correll, Thin Blue Line, supra note 53, at 1015.
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A prosecutor, like any other person, is susceptible to racial bias. 
Prosecutors may “interpret and respond to identical criminal activity dif-
ferently based on the race of the offender.”72 Prosecutors may describe 
Black and White defendants differently, attributing crime by Black de-
fendants to personality flaws while attributing White defendants’ criminal 
acts to “external conditions such as family conflict.”73 Subtle language 
cues may interact with and reinforce stereotypes jurors hold, contributing 
to the ways bias plays a part in juror decision-making.
Furthermore, individuals may be more likely to associate “black”
with “guilty” and “white” with “not guilty,” At least one study indicates 
that these implicit associations predict the way mock jurors evaluate am-
biguous evidence.74 While these associations refer to Black defendants, it 
would logically follow that jurors would similarly evaluate ambiguous ev-
idence in the case of an officer using force in ways that track their implic-
it attitudes toward Black people.
The studies above tend to show that although responses may differ, 
both the police and jurors share the same biases. Body-camera footage, 
then, necessarily shows police use of force from a distinct perspective. 
This distinct perspective reflects the officer’s racial bias. It follows that ju-
rors, who are ordinary citizens, confronted with the ambiguity of a jos-
tling body camera, may draw on these biases in their decision-making.75
Body cameras, therefore, should be viewed cautiously, as the footage 
from them may simply depict what the viewer wants to see.76
Courts should develop instructions to the jury that explain both the 
value of having body-camera footage and the danger of relying too 
heavily on that body-camera footage. Since it is susceptible to analysis 
based on internal attitudes and stereotypes, courts should be careful to 
emphasize that the footage is only one part of the evidence, and that ju-
rors should take all evidence into account when deciding the case. Courts 
could accomplish this by instructing the jury of the dangers of implicit 
bias and warning juries not to place dispositive weight on this type of ev-
idence. Further, Courts should limit the use of body-camera footage if 
they find that the evidence would be too prejudicial for the jury, or the 
jury would place too much weight on the video itself.
72. See ALEXANDER, supra note 41, at 117.
73. Id. at 115.
74. Justin D. Levinson et al., Guilty by Implicit Racial Bias: The Guilty/Not Guilty Implic-
it Association Test, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 187, 190 (2010).
75. See, e.g., Elek & Hannaford-Agor, supra note 33, at 191-92.
76. See Eberhardt et al., supra note 40, at 877.
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Part II
Imagine you are watching a video of a man hitting another man. Is 
this video definitive proof of the guilt of the hitter? What if you later find 
out the man who was hit had a deadly spider on his arm that you 
couldn’t see, and the hitter was trying to kill it?
This Part discusses the supposed—and falsely construed—objectivity 
of video footage. Subpart A discusses the subjectivity of video footage, 
particularly body-camera footage. Subpart B focuses on the Supreme 
Court’s problematic interpretation of the video footage in Scott v. Harris.
A. Inherent Subjectivity of Video Interpretation
“What a piece of video evidence means or signifies depends on who 
is watching, perceiving, and interpreting.”77 And yet, people perceive 
video footage as “truthful, unbiased, objective, and unambiguous repro-
duction of reality, deserving of controlling and dispositive weight.”78
Courts give strong deference to video evidence as an “unambiguous 
source of proof,” with only one reasonable way to view it.79
However, a video’s meaning is shaped by whomever is viewing it, 
and as such should not be prioritized over other types of evidence. As 
humans, we tend to believe our eyes, and thus forget to approach the 
video with the “ingrained, institutionalized skepticism” we use when 
analyzing text.80 We view images as a “neutral depiction of facts,” not 
needing any interpretation.81
The problem with the notion that video is a “neutral depiction of 
facts” is that we may not be getting the entire context surrounding the 
situation going on in the video. Even if we do not get a full picture, 
however, we “mentally complete” the image and interpret it using our 
own backgrounds, experiences, and biases as guides.82 Video is thus inevi-
77. Howard M. Wasserman, Orwell’s Vision: Video and the Future of Civil Rights En-
forcement, 68 MD. L. REV. 600, 608 (2009) [hereinafter Wasserman, Orwell’s Vision].
78. Id. at 607.
79. Id.
80. Elizabeth G. Porter, Taking Images Seriously, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1687, 1756 
(2014).
81. Id. at 1754. See also infra Part II.b, discussing Scott v. Harris and how the Supreme 
Court believes video footage is objective evidence.
82. Porter, supra note 80, at 1753; Caren Myers Morrison, Body Camera Obscura: The 
Semiotics of Police Video, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 791, 801 (2017). See also, e.g., Dan M. 
Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive 
Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 879 (2007). This study showed the video footage 
from the Scott v. Harris decision and asked participants to respond to questions about what 
a jury would be required to find in the case, such as the risk of death, the degree of risk 
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tably subjective; “contextualized within a system that posits blacks as 
more dangerous than whites and devalues black suffering at the hands of 
the police.”83
Additionally, video evidence is limited by context—body-camera 
video especially so. Body-camera footage focuses on one frame of a long-
er situation, and depending on the jurisdiction, begins when police real-
ize they are likely to confront a person or situation that could turn vio-
lent.84 The “temporal limitations” of video footage means that the viewer 
misses what happens before and after the recording, which makes it easy 
to misconstrue the video.85
The limited nature of video evidence is further narrowed in body-
camera cases, where the camera shows events only from the perspective 
of the officer. This limited perspective necessarily fails to cover relevant 
information outside the view of the lens that could have changed the en-
tire outcome of a situation.86 Body-camera footage is fragmentary, elimi-
nating anything not in the field of view of a limited lens.87 If a scene is 
not clearly lit, close enough, or able to be seen from the angle and height 
of the camera, the footage the jury sees provides a piecemeal version of 
the full episode.88 Two opposing (or maybe contrasting) camera angles of 
the same event can present vastly different meanings to viewers.89
For example, body-camera footage may show a suspect shift from 
one foot to the other, looking nervous. A viewer may see this as suspi-
cious activity. However, there may be things going on outside the frame 
of the body camera’s view, such as the officer unbuttoning his gun hol-
ster, or additional officers entering from behind or beside the officer. 
With that added context, the suspect’s body language no longer looks 
quite as suspicious, but could be viewed instead as reacting to an increas-
ingly hostile situation. Since ambiguous body language is interpreted as 
more threatening if a suspect is Black, this lack of added context inherent 
in body-camera footage is especially disadvantageous to Black victims of 
police violence.90 Finally, images, more than text, are more closely corre-
lated with emotion.91 “If police video can heighten the sense of danger to 
the police created in comparison with Harris, and the “relative culpability” of the police 
and Harris. See also Wasserman, Orwell’s Vision, supra note 77, at 626.
83. Myers Morrison, supra note 82, at 804.
84. Id. at 800.
85. Id. at 807.
86. Gonzales & Cochran, supra note 13, at 320.
87. See Myers Morrison, supra note 82, at 807.
88. Id.
89. See id. at 809-11.
90. Elek & Hannaford-Agor, supra note 33, at 191.
91. See Porter, supra note 80, at 1755.
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the officer,” a juror may view the video with a heightened sense of their 
own danger, and thus “place a thumb on the scale in favor of the of-
ficer.”92
Because video evidence is inherently subjective, a juror should not 
be allowed to view the video as if it is objective. If a juror views the vid-
eo as an objective description of the circumstances, she will not get the 
whole picture, and she may fill in the blanks using her own lived experi-
ences and personal biases. This is antithetical to the court’s goal of fact-
finding based only on the evidence presented. Therefore, courts should 
instruct the jury of the subjective nature of the video footage and reiter-
ate that it should not be given undue weight.
B.  Scott v. Harris and Video Objectivity
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has taken the opposite stance, 
claiming that video is objective, and has assigned video footage definitive 
weight.93 In Scott v. Harris, the Supreme Court considered the question: 
“Can an officer take actions that place a fleeing motorist at risk of serious 
injury or death in order to stop the motorist’s flight from endangering the 
lives of innocent bystanders?”94 Phrased that way, this question, as Justice 
Scalia put it, seems to engender only one reasonable answer. Yet the 
Court believed it decided the case in an objective way, stating, “we are 
happy to allow the videotape to speak for itself.”95 This subpart analyzes 
Scott v. Harris to show the dangers of assuming that  video evidence is ob-
jective, and argues that perceived objectivity ultimately hurts Black vic-
tims of police violence because it ignores the subjective nature of inter-
pretation, and the biases inherent in analyzing video footage.
Police officer Timothy Smith deliberately hit the back of Victor 
Harris’s car during a car chase, knocking Harris’s car off the roadway and 
down an embankment where it overturned and crashed.96 As a result of 
his injuries, Victor Harris became a quadriplegic. After Harris filed a suit 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of his Fourth Amendment 
rights,97 the District Court and United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit agreed that there were material issues of fact that needed 
to be decided by a jury. Once the case arrived at the Supreme Court, 
however, Justice Scalia and the seven other justices who joined him stat-
92. See Myers Morrison, supra note 82, at 800.
93. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 373 (2007).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 378 n.5.
96. Id. at 375.
97. Excessive force resulting in an unreasonable seizure.
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ed that, “[t]he videotape quite clearly contradicts the version of the story 
told by respondent and adopted by the Court of Appeals.”98 Scalia thus 
set aside the normal rule of viewing the facts in the light most favorable 
to the plaintiff, because Harris’s version of events was apparently blatantly 
contradicted by the record.99 According to Scalia, no reasonable jury 
could have found for Harris.100 The Court reversed the Court of Appeals 
and granted summary judgment to Scott.101
There was no further analysis beyond a viewing of the video evi-
dence in Scott v. Harris. The outcome seems “a particularly blinded ex-
ample of a more general neglect of narrative analysis on the part of judg-
es.”102 What belied the seeming objective analysis that Justice Scalia 
believed the Court applied, however, was the fact that one Justice took a 
different point of view: Justice Stevens.103 Justice Stevens said that the fact 
that the judges and justices themselves saw different things in the video 
means that a reasonable juror could also have differing opinions about 
what the video depicted.104 Because there was a question of whether Har-
ris’s actions actually rose to a level warranting deadly force, the question 
should have been reserved for a jury.105
To test whether a reasonable jury could believe different things 
about the video, a group of social scientists conducted an empirical 
study.106 In the study, a majority saw the video the same way the Court 
did.107 However, certain discrete groups, such as African-Americans, low-
income workers, and liberals, saw things a different way, and were gener-
ally more pro-plaintiff than the Scott Court.108
98. Harris, 550 U.S. at 378.
99. Id. at 380.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 386.
102. Peter Brooks, Scott v. Harris: The Supreme Court’s Reality Effect, 29 L. & LIT. 143, 
148 (2017).
103. Kahan et al., supra note 82, at 840. See also Harris, 550 U.S. at 395-96 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (noting that although eight of the justices agreed with Justice Scalia, the fact 
that two lower-court judges and Stevens himself saw ambiguity undercuts Scalia’s argu-
ment in footnote 5 that the video “speak[s] for itself.”) “If two groups of judges can disa-
gree so vehemently about the nature of the pursuit and the circumstances surrounding the 
pursuit, it seems eminently likely that a reasonable juror could disagree with this Court’s
characterization of events.” Id. at 396.
104. Harris, 550 U.S. at 389 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 395.
106. Kahan et al., supra note 82, at 841.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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Based on the study, Kahan and his fellow authors believed that the 
Scott Court “was wrong to privilege its own view.”109 They believed that 
by summarily dismissing the case, the Court delegitimized anyone with a 
different perspective, who, in this case, were generally minorities or out-
siders.110 The problem with the Court’s decision is that they believed no 
reasonable jury could view the video as anything other than how they 
viewed it, and yet, two lower courts, a Justice, and at least some of 1350 
participants in a study—a statistically significant number of them—
viewed the tape differently.111
Scott is crucial for understanding how courts understand body-
camera footage as evidence, because the ruling allows judges to summari-
ly dismiss cases if they feel as if “no reasonable jury could believe” any-
thing other than what the judge believes. Video footage is not objective 
as the Scott Court believed.112 Judges, like jurors and police officers, will 
come to the footage with their own biases.113 The Scott decision clearly 
rests on naïve realism, wherein “[f]irst, we naïvely believe that we see the 
world in an objective, neutral manner. Second, we assume that other rea-
sonable people view the world in the same way we do—that is, accurate-
ly.”114
The Supreme Court justices are not alone in this conceptualization 
of the nature of video evidence. Lower courts and academics also think 
this way,115 stating, “advanced body-camera technology can be used to 
create an objective record of what transpired.”116 The danger of this per-
ceived objectivity is that it ignores the biases all individuals harbor, and 
will therefore likely disproportionately impact Black Americans in the 
viewing and analysis of video footage.
Therefore, courts should approach body-camera footage with the 
skepticism they would with any other piece of evidence. Courts should 
also allow juries to be the factfinders of video evidence in every situation, 
for as shown by Justice Stevens in Scott, video footage may be viewed dif-
ferently depending on who is watching. Because of the inherent subjec-
109. Id.
110. Id. at 842.
111. See id. at 881; Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 376, 381-90 (2007).
112. See supra notes 80-95.
113. See, e.g., Myers Morrison, supra note 82, at 801.
114. Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, Naïve Cynicism: Maintaining False Perceptions in 
Policy Debates, 57 EMORY L.J. 499, 513 (2008).
115. See Wasserman, Orwell’s Vision, supra note 77, at 631.
116. John T. Cigno, Truth and Evidence: The Role of Police Officer Body Cameras in Re-
forming Connecticut’s Criminal Justice System, 49 CONN. L. REV. 293, 315 (2016). But cf.
Cruz v. City of Anaheim, 765 F.3d 1076, 1079 (2014) (holding that there was at least
some circumstantial evidence that “could give a reasonable jury pause”).
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tivity of video footage, courts should warn jurors about their biases and 
encourage a holistic approach to analyzing the evidence.
Part III
This Part connects the implicit bias and video discussions to focus 
on how implicit bias informs body camera analysis. The first subpart dis-
cusses the problems with perspective, and how it disadvantages suspects. 
The second subpart explores cognitive biases that affect how viewers ana-
lyze video footage. Finally, the third subpart argues that using body-
camera footage as evidence at trial disadvantages Black victims of police 
violence.
A.  Point-of-View Problems
One of the biggest problems with body-camera footage is the per-
spective bias necessarily associated with it. At the same time, body-
camera footage coming from the officer’s perspective is helpful because 
“(1) the officer’s perspective is the legally relevant perspective, and (2) it 
gives context to the final frames often recorded by citizens.”117 Viewing 
body-camera footage is the best way of putting jurors in the officer’s po-
sition, where they can then determine whether the officer’s actions in 
that position were reasonable.118
However, the officer’s perspective as shown by the body-camera 
footage is severely limited in both range and direction.119 Video cannot 
capture every detail in a situation, such as peripheral movement or what 
the officer is doing with his hands below the view of the camera.120
Moreover, the camera may appear to be unbiased, but the positioning 
and perspective of the camera can frame how the viewer analyzes the 
video without the viewer realizing the impact of the perspective.121
When jurors view the situation from the officer’s point of view, they get 
a “sense of intimacy,” which “heightens sympathy for the officer’s per-
spective because [they] have the sense of seeing through his eyes.”122
117. Gonzales & Cochran, supra note 13, at 308.
118. Id.
119. Howard M. Wasserman, Recording of and by Police: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly,
20 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 543, 552 (2017) [hereinafter Wasserman, Recording of and by 
Police].
120. See Mary D. Fan, Justice Visualized: Courts and the Body Camera Revolution, 50 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 897, 951 (2017).
121. Id. at 948.
122. Id. at 949.
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Finally, the point of view of an officer is also a perspective of bias. 
Law enforcement is not immune from systemic biases and attitudes. 
While Part I discussed shooter bias, police use of a firearm is not as com-
mon as most people believe.123 More commonly, officers disproportion-
ately stop, search, and arrest Black individuals, especially young Black 
men.124 Officers also generally use excessive force at a higher rate for 
Black individuals than White individuals; Black people who are stopped 
are 14 percent more likely to experience excessive force than their White 
counterparts.125 Officers wearing body cameras thus are subject to the 
same implicit biases as jurors, which may in turn reinforce jurors biases 
when viewing the footage.
B.  Body Cameras and Cognitive Biases
A New York Times article by Timothy Williams et. al depicts 
clearly the difficulty in relying on body-camera footage for definitive evi-
dence as well as the way our implicit biases impact how we view the 
footage.126 The article first asks readers how they feel about the police, 
measured by their tendency to trust or distrust the police. Then, the arti-
cle asks the reader to watch a video (with no sound) taken from a chest-
mounted body camera, and then asks the reader to respond to the ques-
tion: “How threatening was the situation the officer faced?” and “How 
confident are you in your answer?”127 The body camera shakes, the sub-
ject being filmed is very close to the officer, and the subject’s arms flail, 
hands fisted tightly.128 Seth W. Stoughton, a law professor at the Univer-
sity of South Carolina and the producer of these videos, said most people 
usually agree that the officer “face[d] a serious threat to his safety and 
quite possibly, his life.”129 When viewing the interaction from a different 
angle, however, we see that the officer and the subject in the camera 
footage are dancing.130 This reflects “deceptive intensity,” according to 
Stoughton.
123. Rich Morin & Andrew Mercer, A Closer Look at Police Officers Who Have Fired 
Their Weapon on Duty, PEW RES. CTR. FACT TANK, Feb. 8, 2017. In fact, only 27 percent 
of police officers have ever fired their gun on the job. Id.
124. Robert J. Smith, Reducing Racially Disparate Policing Outcomes: Is Implicit Bias Train-
ing the Answer?, 37 U. HAW. L. REV. 295, 297 (2015).
125. Id. at 297 n.13.
126. Timothy Williams et al., Police Body Cameras: What Do You See?, N.Y. TIMES, (last 
updated Apr. 1, 2016).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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Another video in the article’s study depicted a foot pursuit, where 
the body camera does not—but a camera from another angle does—catch 
the officer touching his gun, which triggered the suspect’s run.131 A final 
video depicted a car stop, recorded by both a body camera and a dash-
board camera from the police car; neither video truly made clear the en-
tire incident.132 A bystander video from another angle, though, showed 
what the police videos could not, and cleared up some ambiguity about 
whether the police was knocked down by the suspect opening his car 
door, and why the man got out of his car in the first place (a bee was in-
side!).133
The article answered questions based on initial viewings of the 
body-camera footage, and then gave total results based on what people 
answered in the initial question of trust in the police, updated every few 
minutes based on quiz responses.134 The responses from the people who 
took the quiz and followed the questions through the article showed a 
disparity: those people who generally trust the police tended to see a seri-
ous threat more often than those who generally distrust the police.135
The results suggest that what we see in a body-camera video foot-
age will be shaped by the biases we already hold.136 This bias dispropor-
tionately harms Black Americans and slows justice for those subjected to 
excessive force by police. “ ‘Our interpretation of video is just as subject 
to cognitive biases as our interpretation of things we see live,’ Professor 
Stoughton has said, ‘[p]eople disagree about policing and will continue to 
disagree about exactly what a video shows.’ ”137
C. Body Cameras and Racial Biases
If individual interpretations of body-camera footage are necessarily 
influenced by our “cognitive biases,”138 then it stands to reason that indi-
vidual interpretations of body-camera footage are necessarily influenced 
by the implicit racial attitudes and stereotypes we hold. We all come 
from subjective positions, and our “cultural, demographic, social, politi-
cal, and ideological characteristics and attitudes” thus affect what we see 
when we view a video.139
131. Id.
132. Williams et al., supra note 126.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Williams et al., supra note 126.
139. Wasserman, Recording of and by Police, supra note 119, at 553.
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Combining the studies discussed above with the juror’s duties as 
factfinder shows that jurors may interpret body-camera footage using 
their preexisting biases. These biases, which often associate Black people 
with criminality and violence, may make jurors associate a Black subject 
of a body camera video with violence at a higher rate, thereby justifying 
the use of force. Furthermore, individuals tend to see ambiguity as more 
threatening if the target is Black, and biases will direct jurors attention in 
video to things that reinforce previously held attitudes.140 Jurors may see 
weapons on Black subjects at a higher rate than White subjects, especially 
in highly ambiguous videos, which a significant portion of body-camera
footage is.141 Jurors, who are likely not trained in addressing racial bias, 
tend to be “trigger-happy”.142 All of these studies suggest that jurors, after 
seeing body-camera footage, are more likely to conclude that the officer 
was justified in using excessive force against a suspect, even in, and per-
haps especially in, ambiguous circumstances.
The outcome is that police officers, unless some intervention is tak-
en, will likely not be held accountable by juries for excessive force against 
Black Americans. Jury decision-making, influenced as it is by implicit bi-
ases, will not bring justice through body cameras, as was thought when 
they were first introduced. This is not to say that body-camera footage is
not useful or helpful, but rather that when viewed and not given context 
or qualified with warnings of implicit bias, does nothing more than rein-
force beliefs that a juror already has.
Courts should thus be more careful in allowing body-camera foot-
age to be played in the courtroom without sufficient context, or without
warning jurors of the dangers of implicit biases and placing too much 
weight on the video evidence. Body-camera footage may be helpful in 
that it provides additional evidence in cases of police violence, but be-
cause jurors have subjective worldviews that impact how they view the 
footage, there is a danger that Black victims of police violence will not 
get the justice that people hoped for when first advocating for police 
body cameras. Jurors are imperfect, and host implicit attitudes and stereo-
types that may fill in the blanks of the videos, likely making Black victims 
look violent or more criminal than they really are.
To protect the fact-finding mission of the jury based solely on the 
evidence presented, courts should take affirmative steps to counteract po-
tential biases and warn against placing too much weight on the authority 
of the camera. One way to do this is to provide jury instructions to jurors 
to alert them to the danger of placing too much weight on this evidence 
140. Elek & Hannaford-Agor, supra note 33, at 191.
141. See, e.g., supra notes 46-56 and accompanying text (explaining “weapons bias” and 
“shooter bias”).
142. Correll, Thin Blue Line, supra note 53, at 1015.
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and of implicit biases on video interpretation. By doing so, courts can 
minimize the impact of subjective biases and give victims of police vio-
lence hope that justice can be achieved.
Part IV
To adequately address use-of-force by police against Black Ameri-
cans, implicit bias must be addressed in both policing and in courtrooms. 
Body-camera footage, while helpful evidence, will be informed by and 
viewed through a lens of implicit bias. To ensure the evidence is being 
used appropriately, there are steps a court can take to reduce the impact 
of racial bias in juror decision-making. There are also steps police can 
take to reduce the impact of racial bias in policing. These steps can help 
to create a fairer system that holds police accountable when they use ex-
cessive force, especially against Black Americans.
Although White jurors “no longer perceive all trials involving Black 
defendants as racially charged,” “the race of a defendant still influences 
the decisions of many criminal juries.”143 Today, it is no longer socially 
acceptable to be or appear to be racist; when an issue in a trial is racially 
salient, it is “more likely to remind White jurors that they should avoid 
prejudice.”144 Essentially, where a White juror is not reminded by the is-
sues to avoid prejudice, she often lets down her guard and demonstrates 
bias.145 It follows, then, to address bias in a trial, attorneys should intro-
duce racial issues to remind White jurors they need to work to remain 
unprejudiced.146
The downside of making racial issues salient in a trial is that if it is 
too heavy-handed, this technique can backfire and bring out not only 
implicit but also explicit biases of jurors. One set of studies shows that 
some types of individuals, when pressured to comply with mandatory 
nondiscrimination instructions, are “more likely to engage in biased deci-
sion-making, presumably to . . . ‘reassert their personal freedom.’ ”147
Further, “if claims of racial injustice or police misconduct are perceived 
by Whites as baseless or as manipulative attempts to get a seemingly guilty 
defendant off the hook, the strategy might actually backfire.”148
143. Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 39, at 203.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 209.
146. Id. at 223.
147. Elek & Hannaford-Agor, supra note 33, at 193 (quoting E. Ashley Plant & Patricia 
G. Devine, Responses to Other-Imposed Pro-Black Pressure: Acceptance or Backlash?, 37 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 486 (2001)).
148. Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 39, at 223.
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Another way of combating juror bias is to simply include Black 
people on a jury. “The mere presence of Black jurors might be a norma-
tive cue that makes race salient and reminds many Whites about their
egalitarian values.”149  Simply by knowing they would be serving on a ju-
ry that was not entirely composed of White jurors, White jurors were less 
likely to believe a Black defendant was guilty between the time evidence 
was concluded and deliberations.150
Although it is difficult to root out implicit biases even through voir 
dire, voir dire can be used to remind potential jurors about their “egali-
tarian values,” decreasing the likelihood they will express racial bias lat-
er.151 A particular type of voir dire focused on reflecting on oneself and 
the possibility of one’s own racial bias can help remove juror racial bias.152
Finally, courts can provide subtle implicit bias training in the form 
of jury instructions. Judge Mark Bennett, for example, warns the jury and 
asks them to recognize that implicit biases may affect everyone’s deci-
sions, and to think critically about the evidence and resist the urge to be 
influenced by biases.153 These instructions should also be “couched in ac-
curate, evidence-based, and scientific terms,” because jurors tend to 
comply with instructions depending on how persuasive is the instruc-
tion’s rationale.154 Appealing to the universality of implicit biases helps to 
temper defensive reactions to instructions.155
As shown above, judges and attorneys can both diminish the impact 
of racial bias in jury decision-making. Using these techniques to remind 
149. Id. at 221.
150. Kang et al., supra note 24, at 1181.
151. See Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 39, at 222.
152. Kang et al., supra note 24, at 1181–84.
153. Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection: The 
Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 169 (2010). Judge Bennett’s full instruction reads:
As we discussed in jury selection, growing scientific research indicates each 
one of us has “implicit biases,” or hidden feelings, perceptions, fears and ste-
reotypes in our subconscious. These hidden thoughts often impact how we 
remember what we see and hear and how we make important decisions. 
While it is difficult to control one’s subconscious thoughts, being aware of
these hidden biases can help counteract them. As a result, I ask you to rec-
ognize that all of us may be affected by implicit biases in the decisions that 
we make. Because you are making very important decisions in this case, I 
strongly encourage you to critically evaluate the evidence and resist any urge 
to reach a verdict influenced by stereotypes, generalizations, or implicit bias-
es.
Id. at 169, n.85.
154. Kang et al., supra note 24, at 1183.
155. See id.
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jurors to consider biases, jurors may be less likely to use body-camera 
footage to reinforce their biases. If jurors work hard to remain unpreju-
diced, then body-camera footage may be viewed with less racial bias, cre-
ating a fairer process and allowing the jury to view the footage in a more 
nuanced way. If jurors can recognize their own biases in viewing body-
camera footage, then the use of body-camera footage more closely aligns 
with its purpose of addressing police brutality and racial disparities associ-
ated with it.
Implicit bias in policing should also be addressed. Implicit bias af-
fects police in visual surveillance, recall, and armed response.156 This will
likely not only decrease the amount of deadly interactions with the police 
in the first place, but will also then provide a more objective video for 
jurors to view on the back end.
Addressing bias in policing is not just theoretical. A study by E. 
Ashby Plant and B. Michelle Peruche indicates that racial bias can be 
eliminated.157 In the study, law enforcement officers completed a com-
puter simulation, and decided when to shoot and not shoot Black or 
White suspects based on whether there was a gun in the picture.158 The 
initial results mirrored the 2002 Correll et al. study discussed in Part I. 
However, after training with the program, in which “the race of the sus-
pect was unrelated to the presence of a weapon, this racial bias was elimi-
nated both immediately after training and 24 h[ou]r[s] later.”159 After 
training, participants undertook a word-completion task that indicated 
they were “inhibiting racial concepts.”160 This study shows that not only 
is it possible to eliminate racial bias in policing, but that it is not overly 
difficult to do so. Training officers with a program that makes the weap-
on unrelated to the race of the suspect did not just lessen the bias: it elim-
inated it entirely.161
Although this was a short-term study, its results are heartening in 
that it suggests the possibility that through a simple training exercise, po-
lice officers can become more objective in terms of race and weapons bi-
as. If police are more accurate in their use of force because bias has been 
eliminated, body cameras can become a better way of determining 
whether a shooting was justified.
156. Id. at 1139.
157. E. Ashby Plant & B. Michelle Peruche, The Consequences of Race for Police Officers’
Responses to Criminal Suspects, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 180, 180 (2005).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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CONCLUSION
By addressing implicit bias on both ends of the criminal justice sys-
tem, we can hope to bring real justice for those who have long been the 
victims of both explicit and implicit biases. Body-camera footage is a first 
step to improving racial disparities in use of police force. It provides a 
source of evidence that can show problematic police behaviors, in the 
hope the footage can hold police accountable.
On the other hand, we must be cautious about using body-camera 
footage as a cure-all for problems in the justice system. The body-camera 
footage may simply reinforce implicit biases that jurors hold, and thus do 
nothing to address the core problems the cameras were designed to ad-
dress in the first place. Courts should admit this footage as evidence, but 
be careful about how it is presented and how much import is assigned to 
it. Courts should also address how body-camera footage is only part of 
the bigger picture, and should not be viewed as any more or less telling 
than any other piece of evidence. Finally, courts should bring up the issue 
of race to prod jurors into introspection of their own implicit biases. 
Overall, body cameras can bring accountability and protect Black lives, 
but the footage must be viewed cautiously to truly bring about justice.
